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ABSTRACT 
Inter-attitude structure is concerned with how attitudes are connected in memory in a 
coherent and consistent manner. Domain expertise and issue importance are sources of inter-
attitudinal consistency. High levels of issue-relevant thought may also contribute to consistency. 
Guided by research that shows the importance of the distinction between perceived amount of 
thought and actual amount of thought in predicting attitude outcomes, the present work 
attempted to provide evidence of subjective elaboration as an antecedent of Inter-Attitude 
Consistency independent of objective amount of thought, and as a mediating factor of the effect 
of thought on consistency. The project also sought evidence of the spreading of this effect from 
the target attitudes to issues similar and dissimilar to the target issues. Data collected was not 
consistent with predictions. Results, discussion, and exploratory analyses are presented.  
 
Keywords: Elaboration; Metacognition; Inter-Attitude Consistency  
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CHAPTER 1. THINKING ABOUT CONSISTENCY: PERCEIVED AMOUNT OF 
THOUGHT AS A NEW ANTECEDENT FOR INTER-ATTITUDINAL CONSISTENCY 
People tend to prefer consistency, and it serves as a significant motivator of people’s 
thoughts and behavior (see Cialdini, 2001, for discussion; see Allgeier, Byrne, Brooks, & 
Revnes, 1979, for empirical evidence). They comfortably follow the same daily routine, and may 
not even notice until something disrupts it. People also tend to prefer consistency within 
themselves. Either consciously or unconsciously, people notice when they behave inconsistently 
across situations, or when what they report is inconsistent with the way they actually feel 
(Heider, 1958). One area where consistency has only begun to be studied is in the area of inter-
attitudinal consistency (IAC).  
 In this project, my aim was to advance what we know about inter-attitudinal consistency, 
examining potential explanations for its origins and applying concepts from multi-process 
theories of attitude change, as a first step towards studying IAC’s consequences on behavior. 
Specifically, this project examined the effects of perceived amount of thought on people’s IAC.  
Attitudes and Intra-Attitude Components and Structure 
 Attitudes are summary evaluations about an object that consist of affective reactions, 
behavioral responses, and beliefs (Hovland & Rosenberg, 1960). Breckler (1984) used factor 
analysis and found that each of these three components are distinct from one another, but come 
together to form attitudes. The evaluations vary along two key dimensions: Valence (the 
direction of the evaluation, positive or negative) and Extremity (how far away from neutral the 
evaluation is). Attitudes are made up of a variety of features, beyond the affective, cognitive, and 
behavioral components. One such component is attitude strength, which describes how 
influential the attitude is in determining future thoughts and behavior (Krosnick & Petty, 1995). 
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Stronger attitudes are more consequential and more resistant to change. The above components 
are generally thought of as intra-attitude structure. 
Inter-attitudinal Structure  
 The current project sought to examine another type of attitude structure — inter-
attitudinal structure. As opposed to examining the connections between the different components 
related to one attitude object (such as the connections between the attitude and its affective, 
behavioral, and cognitive components), inter-attitudinal structure focuses on the links between 
attitudes toward related attitude objects, and the degree to which these evaluations are consistent 
(Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, 1998; Judd & Krosnick, 1989). Attitudes can be linked for any number 
of reasons. For example, two attitudes can be related to a similar value (Bernard, Maio, & Olson, 
2003; Blankenship, Wegener, & Murray, 2012), or sense of moral concerns (Koleva, Graham, 
Iyer, Ditto, & Haidt, 2012), or simply because one perceives them to be similar (Judd, Drake, 
Downing, & Krosnick, 1991). These linkages go on to form an inter-attitudinal structure or 
attitude system. Consistency refers to the similarity of reported attitudes with previously held 
beliefs about how these attitudes or issues are related. These beliefs about the relationships 
among attitudes and issues are referred to as implicational relations (IRs). This refers to an 
attitude towards one issue implying one’s attitude towards another. Whatever the reason for the 
connection between the attitudes, attitudes are consistent if the reported attitudes match this 
perceived implicational relationship between them (e.g., Lavine, Thomsen, & Gonzales, 1997).  
For example, consider attitudes towards universal healthcare and stricter gun control 
laws. A person who holds a negative implicational relation between these attitudes would infer 
that one’s attitude towards gun control would be negative if his attitude was positive toward 
universal healthcare. In this case, the positive attitude towards one issue implied a negative 
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attitude toward the other. If the IR was positive, then the valances of the two attitudes are 
implied to match (either both positive or both negative). The attitudes are deemed consistent if 
the person’s reported attitudes match this implicational relation. Attitudes are defined 
operationally as consistent with each other if attitudes linked by a positive association are both 
similarly valenced (both objects are evaluated positively or negatively), or if attitudes linked by a 
negative association are oppositely valenced. For example: if I believe that one who supports 
common-sense gun laws should also support abortion rights, and I support both issues, then my 
attitudes are consistent. Theories of cognitive consistency (e.g., cognitive dissonance; Festinger, 
1957; balance theory; Heider, 1958) propose that individuals are motivated for various reasons to 
hold consistent attitudes. These studies also show that inconsistency is not merely a product of 
lack of attention or random responding. Participants in these studies were able to attend to their 
own consistencies, leading to the observed effects. While these experiments demonstrated 
inconsistencies of attitudes with behaviors, dissonance or inconsistency can exist between any 
two “elements” (Festinger, 1957). I am focusing on inconsistencies between two attitudes, and 
between the evaluation in memory and the way someone reports the attitudes (discussed in 
Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959). As an example of inter-attitude inconsistency in the real world, 
consider people’s attitudes towards abortion rights and capital punishment. One might take the 
perspective that abortion and capital punishment both involve the taking of a life, and thus both 
the performing of abortions and the death penalty are morally wrong. At the same time, this 
individual may report being in favor of abortion rights and being against capital punishment (a 
common set of beliefs for the average liberal). These attitudes would be considered inconsistent, 
as the individual’s reported attitudes show a negative relation, but the internal structure (moral 
structure in this case) implies a positive relation.  
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Moreover, Judd, Drake, Downing, and Krosnick (1991) also show a spreading activation 
effect: activating one attitude leads to facilitated activation of other, structurally linked attitudes, 
potentially as a result of people’s motivation to hold consistent attitudes. They demonstrated that, 
similar to repeated reporting of an attitude leading to increased polarization of evaluations, 
reporting an attitude towards an object can polarize evaluations of structurally/semantically 
linked attitudes.  
 Of most importance to the current project is the construct of IAC and its correlates and 
outcomes. Judd and Krosnick (1989) define two commonly studied antecedents of this 
consistency: an individual’s level of expertise in the topic, and the relative importance or 
centrality of the attitudes. Taking into account that much of the research in this area is done using 
politicians and political issues as attitude objects, those high in knowledge are able to more 
efficiently organize attitudes around ideological lines, leading to greater likelihood of consistent 
attitudes. This is potentially due to experts having thought more about political issues than do 
novices, and this increased amount of thought about the same issues leads to the integration of 
the issues in to more coherent, ideologically organized schema (Fiske, Lau, & Smith, 1990). 
Similarly, when an issue or attitude is central or important to the self, it is more likely to be 
activated when similar attitude objects are presented, increasing the likelihood of the attitudes 
being rated consistently (Judd et al., 1991).  
The majority of research attempts to measure consistency using between-individual 
correlations (Judd & Krosnick, 1989).  This way of measuring consistency is ideal when 
individuals possess the same or similar implicational relationships among the issues at hand. 
Implicational relationships refer to an individual’s perceived relationship between evaluations of 
two or more attitude objects. For example, if I believe that people who are in favor of common-
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sense gun laws are also in favor of abortion rights, then I hold a positive implicational 
relationship between those two issues. If I believe that people who are in favor of abortion rights, 
are also against the death penalty, then I hold a negative implicational relationship between these 
two issues. These correlational methods were better used to compare people high in political 
knowledge, as those high in political knowledge are more likely to have similar organizational 
structures of these attitudes, and any differences in the correlations between reported attitudes 
between participants would be from differences in consistency. For novices, if individuals’ held 
implicational relationships among issues are not the same, then low correlations between 
individuals cannot be solely attributed to lower consistency. Lavine et al. (1997), in an attempt to 
design methods that could examine IAC in novices, proposed that a lack of political knowledge 
does not beget a lack of underlying structure, but that the underlying structure and implicational 
relations may not match political ideologies. Therefore, a within-participants constructed 
measure of consistency, taking into account the individual’s unique combinations of 
implicational relations (measured by asking participants to predict a person’s stance on an issue 
while only knowing the person’s stance on a related one), would be able to better measure 
consistency in those low in knowledge. Lavine et al. proposed a balance-based measure of 
structural consistency, one calculated by combining the valence of participants’ attitudes towards 
various political issues with reports of the implicational relationships between them. This method 
would theoretically produce a more stable measure that is less dependent on the level of 
expertise of the individual.  
 In their further discussions of the implicational relationships between attitude objects, 
Lavine et al. (1997) proposed a new possible correlate to consistency: the strength of the 
implicational relationship between political issues. They posited that stronger implicational 
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relationships would be more accessible both at the time of reporting said relationships, and at the 
time of reporting attitudes towards each issue, thereby leading to increased consistency. Consider 
the example from before with universal healthcare and gun laws as the issues. If the 
implicational relationship between the two is stronger, then thinking about one issue is more 
likely to activate this implicational relation as well as thoughts about the other issue, leading to 
greater consistency. Thinking about the issues is theorized to strengthen the implicational 
relation, similar to the effects of thought on links between the components of a single attitude.  
Information Processing: Elaboration, Persuasion, and Attitude Change 
 Another area of research that involves attitude strength, expertise, and thought is 
Elaboration. Elaboration, the extent to which one processes given information and how that 
information is then used, is often discussed in attitudes and persuasion literature and was 
originally studied in the context of dual- and multi-process models of information processing, 
and recently research has explored the structural and metacognitive aspects of elaboration. 
 Multi-process theories propose the existence of two general systems of information 
processing: one more automatic/less thoughtful, and one more effortful/controlled. Strack and 
Deutsch (2004) describe two systems, reflective and impulsive, being the more controlled and 
automatic systems respectively. These systems are capable of running in tandem, but the 
impulsive system is always engaged, faster, and requires less cognitive effort. The systems also 
utilize different types of connections between elements or steps in the system pathways. The 
reflective system is connected via semantic relations, while the impulsive is connected via 
associative links. Key to the concept of multi-process theories, these systems do not necessarily 
operate completely independent of one another, that information processing lies on a spectrum of 
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automatic to controlled processes, and that the same element or information can have the same 
effect on attitudes through different processes in different situations (Petty & Wegener, 1998) 
 The path a person takes through the systems, or which system one relies on, can be 
affected by various factors. For example: distraction during message processing can change the 
way information is processed (Petty, Wells, & Brock, 1976). Different motivations can bias the 
information that is taken in from the environment and recalled when making decisions. 
 As stated above, attitudes research focuses on the amount of thought when distinguishing 
between among paths on this continuum of processing. This difference in thought leads to 
downstream consequences relevant to the strength of the attitude.  An example of multi-process 
models is the Elaboration-Likelihood Model (ELM; Cacioppo & Petty, 1984), with a central 
route that requires more effort/thought and a peripheral route that is more automatic. The central 
route uses information about the target itself (central information), while the peripheral route 
uses other external information as cues to how one should respond (peripheral cues). The central 
route requires people to be able to, or be more motivated to, elaborate on the information, or 
think more about it. These models explore the different circumstances in which different types of 
information are processed, how much processing occurs, and how these differences are reflected 
in changes in attitudes and future decisions. Petty, Cacioppo, and Schumann (1983) and Petty, 
Cacioppo, and Goldman (1981) found that the quality of arguments in a counter-attitudinal 
passage had a greater impact on attitudes when participants were highly involved in the subject 
at hand, but argument quality had less of an impact when participants were less involved. The 
current research is focused on the central, or thoughtful, path and relevant processes, as the 
current project compared groups that either wrote thoughts or did not, and the current project did 
not make any comparisons or focus on any processes that involved peripheral processing. 
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 Most relevant to the current research is the effect of amount of elaboration on the 
consequences of attitudes themselves. Attitudes formed/changed under higher elaboration 
conditions (lower cognitive load, higher need for cognition, etc.) are stronger, more resistant to 
change, and better able to predict future intentions/behaviors (Brinol & Petty, 2015; Haugtvedt & 
Petty, 1992). More thought/processing leads to stronger attitudes, which leads to increased 
resistance to persuasive attempts and better ability to predict future behaviors and decisions. 
 One can apply this to Lavine et al.’s (1997) discussion of the importance of the strength 
of implicational relations in IAC. Lavine et al. discussed that thinking about the political issues 
would activate not only the associated evaluations and reactions to the issues themselves, but 
could potentially also activate the implicational relations between them (participants’ perceived 
relationships between the favoring or opposing of issues) and make the connections more 
accessible. This activation as one thinks about the issues would then strengthen the implicational 
relationships, similar to repeated activation strengthening the links between an object and the 
associated evaluation (Fazio, 1995). These strengthened implicational relationships are then 
more likely to become activated in subsequent tasks designed to measure people’s implicational 
relationships between issues, which leads to an increase in consistency. A similar model was 
tested in Lavine et al.’s paper, where they found that participants randomly assigned to list 
thoughts about target political issues exhibited higher levels of consistency than those who listed 
thoughts about television programs (irrelevant to the target issues).  
 As seen above, the amount one has elaborated on an issue can serve as a property of an 
attitude, and has consequences on downstream attitude constructs, like strength and consistency 
(Petty, Haugtvedt, & Smith, 1995). Recent work has highlighted two different aspects of 
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elaboration: structural and metacognitive. The following two paragraphs will briefly outline this 
distinction. 
Structural components refer to aspects of the attitude involved in the objective content of 
the attitude, the way it was formed and maintained, and connections between it and other attitude 
structures (See, Petty, & Fabrigar, 2008; Barden & Petty, 2008; see also Bassili, 1996). An 
example of a structurally measured component includes the actual knowledge tied to the attitude 
(Wood, Kallgren, & Preisler, 1985). Metacognitive components involve participants’ subjective 
perceptions of their attitudes and attitude structures. An example is measures of participants’ 
subjective knowledge of a subject: simply asking them how informed they are on a topic 
(Davidson, Yantis, Norwood, & Montano, 1985). This distinction is both methodological and 
theoretical. Different measures can be used to examine a construct, such as amount of thought, 
more structurally (counting number of listed thoughts) or more metacognitively (asking 
participants to report how deeply they thought). Some components lend themselves more closely 
to structural measures (like accessibility), while others are more often measured metacognitively 
(like some antecedents of attitude strength, such as attitude certainty and importance).  
Until recently, the distinction between these components was not attended to: at times 
they were used interchangeably (Wegener, Downing, Krosnick, & Petty, 1995). However, 
structural and metacognitive measures of the same construct tend to differ in their ability to 
predict different outcomes. Using the cognitive versus affective basis of attitudes as an example, 
See, Petty, and Fabrigar (2013) incorporated two measures of whether participants’ evaluations 
were based in affect or cognitions: one calculated from relations between participants’ attitudes 
and their needs for cognition and affect (structural) and one computed using participants’ 
subjective responses to questions asking whether they rely more on beliefs or emotions when 
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making evaluations. In addition to their finding that the metacognitive and structural measures 
did not correlate strongly (in Study 1: r = -.002), they found that the metacognitive measure 
better predicted interest in reading paragraphs with either affective or cognitive information, 
while the structural measure better predicted the efficiency in reading the passage.  
Barden and Petty (2008) took a similar approach in theorizing about the distinctions 
between metacognitive and structural properties of elaboration. Through a series of studies, they 
demonstrated that participants’ perceived amount of thought mediated the relationship between 
objective amount of thought (measured by coding and counting relevant thoughts) and attitude 
certainty (an antecedent of attitude strength). Further, they showed that when perceived 
elaboration was manipulated independent of actual amount of thought, the actual amount of 
thought did not differ between groups, and hence did not predict attitude certainty or behavioral 
intentions, but perceived thought did.  
These studies show the power of people’s perceptions of more structural/objective 
components of thought/elaboration above and beyond the power of objective amount of thought, 
and the importance of looking at perceived thought separate from objective thought. So far, I 
have presented literature showing that elaboration leads to strength outcomes (Petty et al., 1995), 
and that perceived elaboration is a significant determinant of strength, independent of objective 
thought. Relating this back to consistency, literature has indirectly related IAC to attitude 
strength (Heider, 1958; Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959). This suggests that thought may be related 
in some way to IAC. This is what was tested by Lavine et al. (1997).  
Elaboration and Consistency 
 As mentioned above, Lavine et al. (1997) manipulated amount of thought by randomly 
assigning participants to list thoughts about a set of target political issues (thought-relevant 
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condition) or about a list of TV programs (thought-irrelevant condition). Thus, inclusion of 
thought conditions examined, indirectly, the effect of issue-relevant elaboration on IAC (via a 
measure of implicational relations), hypothesizing that thinking about a set of issues would lead 
to stronger/more accessible implicational relationships between the issues (e.g., increasing 
participants’ perceptions of the relationships between the issues). These stronger implicational 
relations would then be more accessible to participants during subsequent tasks asking 
participants to report on these relationships. These predictions were consistent with the 
framework laid out by Petty et al. (1995), in which increased elaboration is associated with 
increased strength of the attitude, but Lavine et al. extended this concept to the strength of the 
relationship between attitudes/objects. In their study, Lavine et al. found that thought increased 
participants’ IAC based on the measure of consistency and their political knowledge. Novices 
showed a difference between thought groups on the balance-based consistency measure, but not 
in the ideology-based one. The reverse pattern was found for the political experts. The authors 
concluded that thinking about the issues increased the consistency in both groups: the novices’ 
thought about the issues strengthened their held implicational relationships among the issues, and 
the experts’ thought about the issues did the same but more specifically strengthened the 
ideological organization of the attitudes.    
Present Research 
 Lavine et al. (1997) proposed that increased thought about objects was an antecedent of 
the consistency of one’s attitudes towards those objects, but measures of the amount of 
thought/elaboration were not included in those studies. This leaves room to narrow in on 
questions about what it is about elaboration that leads to increased consistency. One such line of 
questioning focuses on the types of elaboration (perceived vs objective). Lavine et al. shows, 
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without directly measuring it, the effects of objective amount of thought on consistency. 
Previous literature has also shown that perceived amount of thought is significantly related to 
variables that are theoretically related to consistency, such as attitude accessibility (Blankenship 
et al., 2015) and attitude certainty (Barden & Petty, 2008). In sum, elaboration has been shown to 
lead to increased strength of attitudes (Petty et al., 1995), perceived thought has been shown to 
act like objective thought in terms of its downstream consequences and to be a driving force in 
relations that involve objective thought (Barden & Petty, 2008), and elaboration on target issues 
has effects on the IAC of those issues (Lavine et al., 1997). Following this line of thought, there 
is space in the theory of IAC where perceived amount of thought can serve as an antecedent of 
IAC independent of objective amount of thought.  
 As IAC involves connections between attitudes towards different objects, another line of 
questions involves the spreading of the effects of thought on consistency. Judd et al. (1991) 
found that the activation of one attitude leads to the facilitation of activation of other, structurally 
linked attitudes. With this in mind, it is possible that this spreading of activation due to thinking 
about objects involves the activation of not only the attitude, but the activation of the links 
between the attitudes, which would in turn affect evaluative consistency. An interesting point in 
this line examines whether it is thought itself or thought specifically about the objects that can 
account for increases in evaluative consistency. In other words, do the effects spread to similar 
and dissimilar objects (meaning that global thought is more important), or does it only extend to 
similar objects (meaning that it is the thinking about the specific objects that counts)? 
So far, I have broadly discussed the areas of attitudes research involved with inter-
attitudinal structure and consistency, elaboration, and the distinction between metacognitive and 
structural components of elaboration. Research has shown that expertise, importance/centrality 
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of the attitudes, and thought about the target objects all contribute to inter-attitude consistency. In 
this project, my goal was to address unanswered questions involving types of thought/elaboration 
as origins of inter-attitudinal consistency. In testing these, I attempted to expand upon previous 
literature in the following ways: 
 First, this I aimed to expand upon the work of Lavine et al. (1997) by measuring 
participants’ perceived amount of thought and testing the possible mediating effects of the 
perceived amount of thought on the relationship between a thought manipulation and IAC, 
motivated by Barden’s and Petty’s (2008) work. I manipulated whether or not participants are 
thinking about the target issues and measuring their inter-attitudinal consistency, similar to the 
Lavine et al. paper.  
 I also attempted to extend previous work by testing whether the effect of thought on IAC 
extends beyond the issues used in the thought manipulation, focusing on whether the effect 
extends to issues similar to but not included in the thought manipulation, and even further by 
looking at if it extends to issues dissimilar to those in the thought task, drawing inspiration from 
Judd et al. (1991). To this end, participants in both thought groups reported IAC for three groups 
of issues: the issues in the thought task, issues similar to those in the thought task, and issues 
dissimilar to those in the thought task.  
 I proposed two hypotheses: 
 H1A. Participants’ perceived amount of thought about the target issues will drive the 
relationship between objective amount of thought and inter-attitudinal consistency. Specifically, 
I predicted that participants randomly assigned to write about target issues would have higher 
levels of inter-attitudinal consistency than the group that did not write about the issues. This 
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serves as a conceptual replication of Lavine et al.’s (1997) study described earlier, and as a 
necessary first step before being able to test the next part of the hypothesis. 
H1B. Participants’ perceived amount of thought/processing will significantly mediate the 
relationship between the thought manipulation and IAC. This hypothesis was tested using 
PROCESS (Hayes, 2013) to examine the relationship between thought condition and IAC, and 
examine the potential mediating effect of perceived amount of thought. If the indirect effect is 
significant and the direct path is not, that would be evidence that objective amount of elaboration 
(as manipulated in this study) is a determinant of consistency through its effect on perceived 
elaboration. If, in the above situation, the direct path from thought condition to IAC remains 
significant, this is evidence that at least some, but not all, of the ability of objective elaboration to 
determine consistency is through its effect on perceived amount of thought. 
Thus, this project has the potential to put forth two contributions to literature: initial 
evidence of a new antecedent for inter-attitudinal consistency, and that this perceived thought at 
least partially drives the results found by Lavine et al. (1997). 
 H2. In terms of spreading effects of amount of thought, I predicted a significant 
interaction between thought condition and issue group on the participants’ IACs. Specifically, I 
predicted that differences between the two thought conditions will be significant for the target 
issues and the similar issues, and not significant for the dissimilar issues. The thought condition 
would lead to increased consistency among the issues in the target group and among the issues in 
the target-similar group, but will not lead to increased consistency in the dissimilar group. As per 
Judd et al. (1991), writing about the target issues will activate thoughts about other, similar 
issues including those in the second group, as similar objects are linked in memory. This will 
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lead to stronger implicational relations between those issues. Writing about the target issues will 
not activate thoughts about the dissimilar issues, as they are less likely to be linked in memory.  
An attempt was made to account for the possibility that earlier responses to the 
implicational relations task would increase the amount of thought and processing of the issues, 
inflating the consistencies of later-reported relations, by randomizing the order in which the issue 
groups were presented to the participants in the implicational relationships task.  
Pilot Studies 
 The Pilot studies served to assist in the selection of issues that would be included in the 
three separate groups: five issues included in the thought manipulation, five issues in the 
“relevant/similar” group, and five in the “dissimilar” group. The results were used to inform the 
methods for the present research. 
 Pilot 1. The first pilot collected from participants (n = 67) similarity ratings for all 
possible pairs of 11 political issues (55 total unique pairs), using a 7-point scale from “1=Very 
Dissimilar” to “7=Very Similar.” The issues included were Voter ID Laws, Same-Sex Marriage, 
Stem-Cell research, Capital Punishment, Drug testing to qualify for welfare, Immigration Laws, 
Universal Healthcare, Raising the minimum legal drinking age (MLDA), Gun Control, Abortion 
Rights, and a tax on Soda. A variety of different techniques were used to attempt to create two 
five-issue groups: the thought-manipulation group and the “similar” group. The goal was to 
minimize the similarities among the issues included in the thought manipulation group (to show 
that the thought manipulation covers a range of political issues and the issues need to be similar 
in order to test the related hypotheses), and maximize the similarities between the issues in the 
thought manipulation group and the issues in the “similar” group. After obtaining the mean 
similarity scores for the pairs, these similarities were subjected to Multi-Dimensional Scaling 
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(ALSCAL), extracting two dimensions. Through a combination of intuition and looking at the 
produced dimension loadings, the issues were assigned to their respective groups. The average 
similarity within-group (from the similarities among the issues included in the thought 
manipulation group) and the average between-group (from the similarities between the issues in 
the thought manipulation group and the issues in the “similar” group) were then conducted and 
compared. The mean within-group similarity was 2.99 (SD = 0.20) on a scale from one to seven, 
with higher scores indicating higher similarity. The mean between-groups similarity was 3.63 
(SD = 0.42) on the same scale. The issues in the thought manipulation group include Voter ID 
Laws, Same-Sex Marriage, Stem-Cell research, Capital Punishment, and Drug testing to qualify 
for welfare, while the “similar” group included Immigration Laws, Universal Healthcare, Raising 
the MLDA, Gun Control, and Abortion Rights. 
 Pilot 2. This pilot was meant to help select the issues that would appear in the 
“dissimilar” group. Participants were asked for similarities between the issues in the thought 
manipulation group and eight new issues using the same scale and analyses as the first pilot: 
“Increasing Use of Coal and other Fossil Fuels,” “Increasing research on Nuclear Energy,” 
“Reducing the size of National Parks,” “Animal Testing,” “Electric Vehicles (EVs),” “Increased 
Fracking for Oil,” “Human-Made Climate Change,” and “Genetically Modified Organisms 
(GMOs).” After analyzing pairwise similarities between the issues chosen in Pilot 1 to be in the 
thought condition and the new issues, with the goal of choosing the items that were rated least 
similar to the thought-group. The issues chosen were: Electric Vehicles (EVs), Increasing Use of 
Coal and other Fossil Fuels, Increasing Research on Nuclear Energy, Reducing the size of 
National Parks, and Animal Testing.  
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CHAPTER 2. METHOD 
Participants 
336 students were recruited from introductory psychology classes. The sample was 
comprised of approximately 59% female, with a mean age of 19.06 years old. Using G*power 
(Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009), I conducted an a priori power analysis to determine 
the sample size needed to detect the 2 x 3 mixed ANOVA interaction, with a small effect size (f 
= 0.1) and a small correlation among the within-subjects levels (r = 0.1).  According to the 
analysis, collecting 300 participants should be sufficient to find the 2 x 3 interaction effect with a 
power of at least 0.8.  
Power analyses using Mplus (Muthén & Muthén, 2019) report that a sample size between 
250 and 300 should be sufficient to detect significant effects in all paths, as well as the indirect 
effect, with a power of at least .8. To calculate the needed effect size, I simulated the proposed 
mediation model by using effect sizes from the literature, and estimating new proposed paths 
(see Figure 1). The direct path from condition to IAC was taken from Lavine et al. (1997) (d = 
.54), the path from condition to perceived thought was taken from Barden and Petty (2008), and 
the path from perceived thought was estimated to be r = .2, a small to medium effect size. These 
proposed sample sizes are larger than those used in the Lavine et al. (1997) (n’s = 112 and 169) 
and Barden and Petty (2008) papers (n’s ranging from 81 to 214). This discrepancy is due to the 
power analysis accounting for the test of the previously unexamined perceived elaboration-to-
IAC path, which is presumed to be a small effect. 
Honesty and attention check items were included in the survey participants took in order 
to check for attention to the tasks and for random responding. No participants were excluded 
from analyses due to failure of attention check items.  
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Design 
 The study design was a 2 (Thought Condition: writing vs. not writing) x 3 (Issue group: 
thought manipulation issues vs. manipulation-similar issues vs. manipulation-dissimilar issues) 
mixed-design, with the thought condition as a between-groups factor and issue group as a within-
group factor. Participants in the writing group were asked to list three thoughts towards each of 
five political issues, whereas participants in the no-writing group were not. The dependent 
variable was the proportion of participants’ attitudes that are consistent with their perceptions of 
the structural relationships between the attitudes (Balance-based Inter-attitudinal Consistency; 
Lavine et al., 1997).  
Procedure 
 All of the materials were administered through MediaLab (Jarvis, 2014). All participants 
were given the opportunity to give their informed consent before participating in the study. 
Participants were presented with the target political issues one at a time (randomized order 
between participants). Participants in the writing group were first asked to provide their attitude 
toward the issue, and then list their thoughts towards the issue. Participants in the no-writing 
group were simply asked for their attitude. Participants in both groups then provided a measure 
of how much they perceived they thought about the issue (i.e., perceived thought measure), 
before moving on to the next issue. After reporting their reactions toward the target issues, 
participants then responded to a global perceived thought measure, a measure of their 
implicational relationships for all pairs of issues in the target group, as well as for all the pairs of 
issues within the similar and dissimilar groups, and answer a few questions designed to test 
political knowledge. After these, all participants responded to demographics questions, a funnel 
debriefing, and questions about the honesty of their responses, and then were dismissed.  
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Materials 
 Independent Variables.  
 Thought Manipulation. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two levels of the 
thought manipulation: one group was asked to list three reactions to each of the five issues in the 
thought manipulation group of issues, while the other group did not write anything. This 
manipulation was adapted from the one used by Lavine et al. (1997). An a priori exclusion 
criteria based on failure to list any thoughts when instructed did not lead to exclusion of any 
participants 
 Issue Groups. The within-group factor was the issue group. All participants provided 
attitudes towards and implicational relations between issues in each of the three groups: the 
issues in the thought manipulation task, issues rated to be similar to the issues in the thought 
task, and issues rated to be dissimilar to those in the thought task (see Table 1 in Appendix A). 
 Measured Variables. All participants indicated how much they perceive they thought 
about the issues in the thought task using Perceived Elaboration items adapted from Barden and 
Petty (2008). There were two items per issue (see Appendix B). There was also an item asking 
the participants to indicate more globally how much they perceived they thought during the task, 
adapted from the same items from Barden and Petty’s work, though the focus was on the 
perceived thought about each individual item. One of the main goals of this study was to 
examine the mediating effect of perceived elaboration on the relationship between amount of 
thought and inter-attitudinal consistency. With these items, we could achieve this as well as 
explore if the perceived amount of thought specifically about the target issues has predictive 
power above and beyond that of the perceived amount of more general thought. 
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 Dependent Variable. The main dependent variable for this study was a measure of 
balance-based inter-attitudinal consistency, adapted from Lavine et al. (1997). This measure was 
calculated by finding the proportion of participants’ attitudes towards issues that are consistent 
with their perceived structural relationship between the issues. This measure was chosen as it is a 
more valid measure than the correlation methods when the sample contains participants who are 
not knowledgeable about political ideology. Previous measures utilizing correlations were unable 
to explain differences in consistency between novices and between novices and experts, as the 
correlational designs relied on the participants having the same organizational structure in 
memory for the target objects (Judd & Krosnick, 1989). This measure of inter-attitudinal 
consistency attempts to account for the possibility that different individuals may utilize different 
implicational relationships amongst the issues being presented by directly asking participants for 
their implicational relationships. 
 I followed the same procedure used by Lavine et al. (1997). Participants reported their 
attitudes towards all of the issues on a scale ranging from -2 to +2 (the valences of these attitudes 
are the important aspect for this measure. They also provided perceived implicational 
relationships for pairs of issues within the respective groups (thought task, similar, and 
dissimilar). This task presented an unnamed person (Person X) to the participants, and said that 
person X favors issue Y. The participants were then asked if they believed person X would 
favor/oppose issue Z, given the attitude toward issue Y. This measure aims to assess the structure 
of participants’ attitudes. The responses were coded as -1 = oppose and 1 = favor. The 
participants saw an implicational relations item for each pair of issues within the respective 
groups (with five items in each of three groups, this becomes 10 pairs in each group for a total of 
30 pairs overall). These implicational relationship items provided a direction of the relationship 
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between the issues in the pair (positive if participants report that Person X would be in 
favor/oppose both issues in the pair, negative if the participant reports that Person X would be in 
favor of one issue and oppose the other). The direction of the relationship was then compared to 
the valences of the attitudes reported earlier. For each pair of issues, it was determined if the 
participants’ attitudes are consistent with their perceived relationship between the issues by 
multiplying the response to the IR item for each pair by the product of the two attitude responses 
to the pair of issues. The valence of this final product indicates the consistency of that particular 
pair of attitudes, with a positive product indicating that the reported attitudes were consistent 
with the reported IR, and a negative product indicating that the attitudes were inconsistent. The 
final score was calculated by finding the proportion of the pairs that were consistent, separated 
into three separate scores by issue group. 
Covariates. Participants also responded to a short five-item political knowledge measure. 
This measure was used to test and possibly control for the effects of the level of political 
knowledge held by the participants, as Lavine et al. (1997) found that participants’ inter-
attitudinal consistencies were less affected by thought when the participants were high in 
political knowledge (referred to as “experts” in their paper).  
 Ancillary Measures. In addition to the above, reaction times for all measures were 
recorded for various exploratory purposes involving the structural nature of IAC and the 
implicational relationship measure. Objective amount of thought for participants in the writing 
group was calculated by correlating the participants’ expressed attitudes and the favorability of 
the thoughts listed for each of the issues (Wegener et al., 1995). This was done for exploratory 
purposes, for the informing of future studies, and in the informing of potential manipulations of 
objective thought that are appropriate in the given paradigm. All participants also reported their 
22 
attitudes towards all of the issues on a four-point scale from “Strongly against” to “Strongly in 
favor.” This measure can be used to explore possible effects of variations of attitude valence or 
extremity on their consistency, though I have no a priori predictions about these effects, as well 
as contributing to the developing of a manipulation of objective thought.   
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CHAPTER 3. RESULTS 
Main Analyses 
First, descriptive statistics and analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were used to examine the 
possible influences of the demographics of the sample. None of the demographics significantly 
predicted any of the outcomes of interest (ps > .11). I then proceeded to create the measures of 
subjective thought and IAC as laid out in the methods section. The measures of item specific 
subjective thought all significantly correlated with each other, and so were combined, with a 
Cronbach’s α = .83. The global subjective thought item strongly correlated with the combined 
item-specific subjective thought item (r = .69, p < .001) so they were averaged to create a single 
measure of subjective thought about the issues throughout the participants’ prescribed task 
(Cronbach’s α = .85). Analyses were run separately using the final combined measure and the 
average from the item-specific measures, but there were no significant differences in estimates, 
confidence intervals, or interpretations. Statistics and estimates reported are from analyses using 
the final combined measure of subjective thought.  
 The first set of hypotheses were tested using Model 4 (single mediator) of Hayes’ 
PROCESS software (Hayes, 2017) macro for SPSS. The results of this analysis can be seen in 
Figure 1. I break down the analyses step by step here. For these analyses, and for those involved 
with Hypothesis 2, analyses were run both with and without controlling for political expertise, a 
factor identified by Lavine et al. (1997) as needing controlled for. As results and interpretations 
did not significantly differ, all analyses that include thought condition as a predictor of IAC 
include political expertise as a covariate in the model.  
 As expected, thought condition significantly predicted subjective thought, such that 
participants given the chance to list their thoughts about the issues reported greater subjective 
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thought (b = 0.59, SE = 0.12, t(329) = 4.88, p < .001, 95% CI [0.35, 0.83]). The means for the 
different conditions on subjective thought were 4.41 (SD = 1.15) and 5.03 (SD = 1.06) for the no 
writing and writing conditions, respectively.  Contrary to predictions, and to past literature, 
thought condition did not significantly predict IAC (b = 0.04, SE = 0.02, t(329) = 1.81 p = .07, 
95% CI [-0.003, 0.08]). Once the combined subjective thought measure was added to the model 
as a mediator, subjective thought did not significantly predict IAC (b = -0.01, SE = 0.01, t(329) = 
-0.84, p = .40, 95% CI [-0.03, 0.01]), and thought condition did not significantly predict IAC 
after accounting for the effect of subjective thought (b = 0.04, SE = 0.02, t(329) = 1.97 p = .05, 
95% CI [0.00, .08]). Bootstrapped sampling procedure was used to estimate the coefficient and 
confidence interval for the indirect effect (ab = -0.005, SEBootstraped = 0.01, 95% CI [-.02, .01]). 
The presence of zero in the confidence interval implies that the indirect effect of condition on 
IAC is not significant, which is consistent with the other results (Hayes, 2017).  
 Hypothesis 2 was tested using a 2(Thought Condition: writing vs. no-writing) x 3(Issue 
group: thought manipulation issues vs. manipulation-similar issues vs. manipulation-dissimilar 
issues) mixed design ANOVA, with the thought condition as the between-subjects factor and the 
issue group as the within-subjects factor. A visualization of this analysis can be seen in Figure 2. 
 As was seen in the mediation analyses, the main effect of condition on IAC was non-
significant (F[1, 328] = 0.91 p = .34, η2 = .003). There was a significant main effect of issue 
group (F[2, 656] = 21.15, p < .001, partial η2 = .06). Pairwise comparisons revealed that attitudes 
were more consistent in the target-dissimilar group than in the target and target-similar groups 
(Ms = .67, .58, and .59 respectively, Bonferroni corrected ps < .001). The IACs in the target and 
target-similar groups did not significantly differ (corrected p = 1.0). Contrary to predictions, this 
main effect was not qualified by the interaction (F[2, 656] = 0.97 p = .38, η2 = .003).  
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Exploratory Analyses 
 Exploratory analyses on reaction times for the IR task were performed to inform future 
research in this area. As IAC and IR are thought to be structural components of attitudes, one 
explanation for the effect of thought on IAC found in literature is through the increase in the 
accessibility of the relations among attitudes. One way this could present itself is through quicker 
reaction times (RTs) for responses to the IR task items for participants in the thought condition. 
To test for this, the RTs for the IR tasks were log transformed (to reduce the skewness of the 
distribution of latencies, according to the practices in the field as described in Fazio, 1990), 
averaged by issue group, then run as the outcome in the same 2 x 3 mixed ANOVA as was 
previously used. A visual representation of the results can be seen in Figure 3. Similar to the 
hypothesis involving IAC as the outcome, I would predict that RTs would be shorter for those 
who completed the writing task, and that RTs would be shorter for IR tasks involving issues in 
the target group.  
 What I found was not entirely consistent with this prediction. The main effect of thought 
condition was not significant (F[1,328] = 2.76, p = .10, η2 = .01). The main effect of issue group 
was significant (F[2,656] = 5.45, p = .004, η2 = .02). Pairwise comparisons revealed that the 
difference between the target group and the target similar group was significant (Ms = 3.75 and 
3.77, respectively, corrected p = .005).  
  
26 
CHAPTER 4. DISCUSSION 
 The results of the project were not as predicted. Of most surprise was the lack of 
statistical significance of the effect of thought on IAC, though there are potential explanations 
for why the effect was not found to be significant in this study. The effect size for objective 
thought on IAC was much smaller than that found by Lavine et al. (d = 0.20 vs 0.54).  As I used 
their estimate to conduct a power analysis, it is possible that the test for the effect was 
underpowered. It is also important to keep in mind the procedural differences between the 
present study and that of Lavine et al. The original study was published in 1997, approximately 
twenty-three years ago at the writing of this paper. They collected data on paper, while I 
collected my data on computers. They used an irrelevant thought comparison group, while I used 
a no-thought group. It is possible that the way people organize their thoughts about these issues 
has changed over the last twenty-three years. It is also possible that there is a difference between 
writing and typing in students’ engagement in the task, leading to a weaker effect of the thought 
manipulation. Before I can test for any potential mechanisms or moderators, I first need to be 
able to reliably find the base effect of thought on IAC.  
In addition to the lack of evidence for an effect of thought on IAC directly, the data also 
provide no evidence of subjective thought as an antecedent of IAC independent of objective 
thought. As IAC and IRs can be considered structural parts of attitudes, perceived amount of 
thought may not serve as a plausible antecedent of IAC (for discussion of the different predictive 
abilities of metacognitive and structural measures, see See et al., 2013). Future studies should 
manipulate subjective thought to test for this. By manipulating subjective amount of thought 
about the target issues independent of objective amount of thought, a more accurate measure of 
the relationship between subjective thought and IAC can be tested.  
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There was also no evidence that the effect of objective thought on IAC spreads to similar 
issues through semantic connections between issues. As above, this could be due to a lack of 
power, as the effect sizes of the effects were much smaller than anticipated. It cannot be 
overlooked that there is a potential flaw in the design of the issue groups. All of the issues in the 
“dissimilar” group are environment-related. This common theme connecting all of the issues in 
one group likely could have led to the unexpected and relatively high IAC scores for this issue 
group (for discussion of attitudes connected by similar values, see Blankenship et al., 2012). It is 
possible that the connections between issues that share a common theme are already salient 
regardless of the amount of thought, hence the high degree of IAC. On the other hand, the 
connections between issues in the target and similar groups, not being connected by a clear 
common theme, may be less salient or effectively non-existent. In this case, thinking about the 
issues may not be enough to strengthen the connection if the connections are weak enough that 
they are not activated during the thought task.  
Regarding the exploratory analyses using the response times as the outcome of the 2 x 3 
design, results provided some information to assist in moving this area forward.  The lack of 
main effect of thought group is concerning but expected given the results from the other 
analyses. The lack of difference between the target group and dissimilar group could also be 
expected, this is most likely a factor of the pre-existing similarities within the dissimilar group 
discussed above. More research is required to explore the structural nature of IRs in memory.  
Currently, the thoughts in the thought condition are being coded in order to use them to 
create a measure of objective thought. This measure will then be used to run all main analyses 
again, but only with the participants in the thought condition. These analyses will look at the 
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CHAPTER 5. FUTURE DIRECTIONS  
 Because I failed to find evidence for the effect of thought on IAC, more research is 
necessary to break down this effect. Before I can test for potential moderators, mediators, or 
mechanisms, I first need to have a reliable way to find the effect. My next round of studies will 
focus solely on this, with the goal of finding the materials and circumstances in which the effect 
of thought on IAC is reliable, and explore why the effect may not be consistent across designs 
and materials. I am currently designing a study that removes the similar and dissimilar groups 
and changing the “no-thought” control to an “irrelevant-thought” control. This idea is supported 
by a comparison of the means I found with those found by Lavine et al. (1997). The mean IAC 
of my thought group is almost identical to that of Lavine’s et al. in the study I used for the a 
priori power analysis (experiment 1, p. 741), Ms = .59 and .58 respectively. The control group 
means are not similar, with my control group producing a larger mean than that of Lavine’s et 
al., Ms = .56 and .39 respectively. This shows the potential for a difference in effect based on the 
type of control group, my no-thought design vs Lavine’s et al. irrelevant-thought design, and 
justifies future studies using the irrelevant-thought design. One potential issue with this design is 
in the future incorporation of a measure of subjective thought. Because the design is assigning 
participants to two separate sets of objects, but the subjective thought is focused only on the 
relevant issues, the groups cannot be compared on average levels of subjective thought. So while 
this study would provide an additional test of the effect of objective amount of thought on IAC, 
this design is unable to incorporate measures of subjective amount of thought. 
A possible solution calls for changes to the manipulation. Once it has been determined 
that there is an effect of thought on IAC, studies can be performed that broaden this effect of 
thought into an effect of processing. The effect of thought on IAC is likely due to the thought 
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leading to processing of information about the issues (in the case of this project, processing self-
generated thoughts). The manipulation can be modified to reflect this, utilizing manipulations 
found in other areas of attitudes literature, such as distraction. For example, all participants 
would write thoughts about the issues, but half would be randomly assigned to perform audio 
multitasking activities, reducing their ability to process information as they write their thoughts 
(Wegener et al., 2010). This way, both groups would be given the same information about the 
same issues, with the difference being the amount that the information was processed. With past 
evidence and discussion that IAC and IRs may behave similarly to measures of attitude strength 
(Lavine et al., 1997), those who process information about the issues more, or process the 
information better, should show higher levels of consistency.  
 Continuing with the focus on the base effect of thought on IAC, I also plan to examine 
possible attitude structures that contribute to the effect. Lavine et al. (1997) did not propose 
theory as to the connections between the issues they chose for their manipulation, and did not 
distinguish between the possibilities of thought about the issues creating new connections or 
strengthening connections that are already present in memory. In addition to the study mentioned 
previously, I am developing a study to pilot the issues again, to look at the possible differences 
and similarities between the issues that may be a factor in the effect of thought on IAC. I will be 
asking participants to identify the value that most closely relates to each issue, as values have 
been shown to act as superordinate structures of attitudes (for discussion, see; and Bernard et al., 
2003; Blankenship et al., 2012). It is possible that the effect of thought on IAC can be maximized 
if the issues in the thought manipulation already share connections (through a similar value, in 
this case) and are not already highly consistent. These new pilots will potentially help in the 
creation of new thought manipulation target groups for future studies. It is important to this area 
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of literature to explore the conditions in which this effect is reliable, and the possible reasons for 
differences in the effect across studies. 
Once I have found a reliable effect of thought on IAC, then I can begin investigating the 
mechanisms and moderators of interest.  As stated above, one direction is to manipulate 
subjective thought to test if objective thought overpowers effect of subjective thought on IAC, or 
if subjective thought serves as a better predictor of the IR confidence measure reported in Judd et 
al. (1991) and Wegener et al. (1995). This potential study would take a similar form to those 
conducted by See et al. (2013) investigating the structural and meta-bases of attitudes 
differentially predicting read speed vs interest. Subjective thought can be manipulated using a 
bogus feedback paradigm. After participants complete a thought task about the target issues, the 
participants would be told that they had listed fewer (or more) thoughts than the average amount 
listed by the other participants (for an example of this manipulation, see Barden & Petty, 2008). 
Analyses could then be run predicting IAC and Judd’s et al. (1991) confidence measure from 
objective amount of thought and perceived amount of thought.  
 In conclusion, this project did not find evidence to support my predictions of subjective 
amount of thought as an antecedent of IAC, of objective thought as contributing to IAC, or of the 
spreading activation effect of thought on IAC (likely because of the lack of the base effect of 
thought on IAC and the issue with the already-salient connections in the dissimilar issue group). 
Does this mean that the effect is truly a null effect? I do not believe there is enough evidence to 
conclude that the effect is not there, but that differences in design, materials, or both lead to 
different degrees of effect (for an example of differences in design contributing to failed 
replications, see Luttrel, Petty, & Xu, 2017). Luttrel, Petty, and Xu (2017) discuss aspects of 
replications that can lead to failures to replicate, including design elements such as differences in 
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manipulations and dependent measures. Moving forward, it would be good to also refer to 
Brandt’s et al. (2014) “Replication Recipe” to ensure that future replication attempts are close 
replications when they are meant to be to be.  
Future work will first focus on the base effect of thought on IAC by reverting the thought 
manipulation as well as investigating the different ways issues can be connected in memory. 
Once established, the ideas of subjective amount of thought as predictor of IAC can be studied. It 
is important to the field to conduct these process heavy studies pushing forward our 
understanding of inter-attitude structure, as an understanding of the internal consequences and 
mechanisms is necessary to inform future work on various potential real-world applications. It is 
also important to conduct these studies to establish the existence and reliability of effects, so as 
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Issues included in each thought group 
Issue Group 
Target Issues Similar Dissimilar 
Voter Identification Laws Immigration Laws Electric Vehicles (EVs) 
Same-Sex Marriage Universal Healthcare Use of Coal and Fossil 
Fuels 
Stem Cell Research Raising Minimum Legal 
Drinking Age 
Increasing research into 
Nuclear Energy 
Capital Punishment (i.e., 
the death penalty) 
Gun Control Reducing Size of 
National Parks 
Drug Testing for Welfare 
Recipients 





















Figure 1: Mediation model. “*” denotes significant path. 







Indirect Effect CI: [-.02, .007] 























Figure 2. 2 x 3 Mixed ANOVA Results with IAC as criterion. Significant main effect of Issue 
Group: F(2, 656) = 21.15, p < .001, η
2 
= .06. Interaction: ns 






































Figure 3. 2 x 3 Mixed ANOVA Results with Log-transformed reaction times as criterion. 
Significant main effect of Issue Group: F(2, 656) = 5.45, p = .004, η
2 
= .016. Interaction: ns 
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APPENDIX B. MEASURES AND MANIPULATIONS 
Independent Variable: Thought Manipulation:  
 Introductory instructions for no-writing group. 
The purpose of this study is to create an inventory of ISU students’ opinions towards 
various political issues. In this opinion inventory task, you will be shown a set of political issues. 
After seeing each issue, you will be asked about your reactions (i.e. your opinions) towards the 
issues. 
Introductory instructions for writing group. 
The purpose of this study is to create an inventory of ISU students’ opinions towards 
various political issues. In this opinion inventory task, you will be shown a set of political issues. 
After seeing each issue, you will be asked about your reactions (i.e. your thoughts and opinions) 
towards the issues. 
Writing Instructions for the writing group. The wording of the second paragraph will 




The next issue is (insert issue here). Please think about your reactions, thoughts, and 
feelings towards the issue of (issue). Please use the boxes below to write your thoughts.  
 
Please list one thought per box, then press the enter key to advance to the next box for a 
new thought. There are four (4) boxes to list up to four (4) thoughts, but you are not required to 
use all of them.  
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 Attitude items for Target group (part of manipulation task). All will be on a scale 
from 1= Oppose to 4= in Favor  
1. The next issue is VOTER IDENTIFICATION LAWS. Voter ID Laws refer to those that 
require voters to present government-issued identification to be able to cast a vote. Please 
indicate your evaluations on the scale provided. 
2. The next issue is SAME-SEX MARRIAGE. Same-Sex Marriage refers to the ability of 
individuals to marry whoever they wish, regardless of the sex of the partner. Please indicate your 
evaluations on the scale provided. 
3. The next issue is STEM CELL RESEARCH. Stem-Cell research refers to using federal 
funding to the study of Human Embryonic Stem Cells. Please indicate your evaluations on the 
scale provided. 
4. The next issue is CAPITAL PUNISHMENT. Capital Punishment, more commonly known as 
the “death penalty”, refers to whether or not courts can sentence someone to death. Please 
indicate your evaluations on the scale provided. 
5. The next issue is DRUG TESTING FOR WELFARE RECIPIENTS. Drug-testing for Welfare 
Recipients refers to recipients of Welfare being required to submit to drug-testing in order to 
qualify for future/continuing aid. Please indicate your evaluations on the scale provided. 
 Issue-Specific wording for the writing task instructions. 
1. Please think about your reactions, thoughts, and feelings towards the issue of Voter ID laws. 
Please use the boxes below to write your thoughts. 
2. Please think about your reactions, thoughts, and feelings towards the issue of Same-Sex 
Marriage. Please use the boxes below to write your thoughts. 
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3. Please think about your reactions, thoughts, and feelings towards the issue of Stem Cell 
Research. Please use the boxes below to write your thoughts. 
4. Please think about your reactions, thoughts, and feelings towards the issue of Capital 
Punishment (i.e. the Death Penalty). Please use the boxes below to write your thoughts. 
5. Please think about your reactions, thoughts, and feelings towards the issue of Drug Testing for 
Welfare Recipients. Please use the boxes below to write your thoughts. 
 Issue-Specific Perceived Thought. Similarly worded items will be on the same scale, 
listed below the first example of each.  
1. To what extent did you think a lot about your attitude towards Voter ID Laws during the 
reaction task? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
A little 
  
   A lot 
 
2. To what extent did you take the time you needed to consider your attitude towards Voter ID 
Laws during the reaction task? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
  
   Definitely 
 
1. To what extent did you think a lot about your attitude towards Same-Sex Marriage during the 
reaction task? 
2. To what extent did you take the time you needed to consider your attitude towards Same-Sex 
Marriage during the reaction task? 
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1. To what extent did you think a lot about your attitude towards Stem Cell Research during the 
reaction task? 
2. To what extent did you take the time you needed to consider your attitude towards Stem Cell 
Research during the reaction task? 
1. To what extent did you think a lot about your attitude towards Capital Punishment (i.e. the 
Death Penalty) during the reaction task? 
2. To what extent did you take the time you needed to consider your attitude towards Capital 
Punishment (i.e. the Death Penalty) during the reaction task? 
1. To what extent did you think a lot about your attitude towards Drug Testing for Welfare 
Recipients during the reaction task? 
2. To what extent did you take the time you needed to consider your attitude towards Drug 
Testing for Welfare Recipients during the reaction task? 
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Additional Measured Variable: 
 Global Subjective elaboration Items: 
While completing the Opinion Inventory (i.e. all of the reaction tasks), to what extent did you 
think a lot about your opinions toward the issues? 
Seven-point scale from 1=a little to 7=a lot  
While completing the Opinion Inventory (i.e. all of the reaction tasks), to what extent did you 
take the time you needed to consider your attitude towards the issues? 
Seven-point scale from 1= not at all to 7=definitely  
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Dependent Variable Creation: Attitudes for non-target group issues 
 Instructions/transition. 
In this section, we will be asking for your evaluations of another set of political issues. 
Target-Similar Group.  
1. The next issue is IMMIGRATION LAWS. Immigration Laws refer to laws that make it harder 
for people to immigrate to this country. Please indicate your evaluations on the scale provided. 
2. The next issue is UNIVERSAL HEALTHCARE. Universal Healthcare refers to single-payer, 
government-funded healthcare options, as an alternative to private healthcare. Please indicate 
your evaluations on the scale provided. 
3. The next issue is RAISING THE MINIMUM LEGAL DRINKING AGE. Raising the 
minimum drinking age refers to changing the minimum legal age from 21 to 25. Please indicate 
your evaluations on the scale provided. 
4. The next issue is GUN CONTROL. Gun control refers to laws that require background 
checks, limit clip sizes, ban bump stocks, and ban civilians from owning certain military 
firearms. Please indicate your evaluations on the scale provided. 
5. The next issue is ABORTION RIGHTS. Supporting Abortion rights refers to supporting a 
woman’s right to choose to abort her pregnancy. Please indicate your evaluations on the scale 
provided. 
 Target-Dissimilar Group. 
1. The next issue is ELECTRIC VEHICLES (EVs). Electric Vehicles refers to increasing 
research on improving technology related to electrically powered cars and other forms of 
transportation. Please indicate your evaluations on the scale provided. 
47 
2. The next issue is USE of COAL AND FOSSIL FUELS. This issue refers to continuing to use 
coal and other fossil fuels, and not looking at other, renewable forms of energy. Please indicate 
your evaluations on the scale provided. 
3. The next issue is INCREASING RESEARCH INTO NUCLEAR ENERGY. This issue refers 
to increasing funding into nuclear technology to make it safer, more reliable, and produce more 
energy. Please indicate your evaluations on the scale provided. 
4. The next issue is REDUCING THE SIZE OF NATIONAL PARKS. This issue refers to the 
federal government reducing the total size of national parks, allocating the lands to other various 
purposes. Please indicate your evaluations on the scale provided. 
5. The next issue is ANIMAL TESTING. Animal testing refers to the use of animals to test 
various products before marketing the products to humans. Please indicate your evaluations on 
the scale provided.  
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Dependent Variable: Implicational Relationships Measure 
 Instructions: 
In this section, you will be shown the opinion of Person X on a particular issue. Given 
Person X’s opinion, you will be asked if Person X would favor or oppose a second issue.  
For example: ‘If person X is in favor of the idea that humans are responsible for climate change, 
would Person X favor or oppose Affirmative Action?’ Please indicate your response on the scale 
provided. Please mark ‘Favor’ or ‘Oppose’. 
Items. All items ask the participants to respond either Favor or Oppose. 
 Target Issues. 
1. If Person X Favors VOTER ID LAWS, would Person X favor or oppose SAME-SEX 
MARRIAGE? 
2. If Person X Favors VOTER ID LAWS, would Person X favor or oppose STEM CELL 
RESEARCH? 
3. If Person X Favors VOTER ID LAWS, would Person X favor or oppose CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT (i.e. the Death Penalty)? 
4. If Person X Favors VOTER ID LAWS, would Person X favor or oppose DRUG TESTING 
FOR WELFARE RECIPIENTS? 
5. If Person X Favors SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, would Person X favor or oppose STEM CELL 
RESEARCH? 
6. If Person X Favors SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, would Person X favor or oppose CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT (i.e. the Death Penalty)? 
7. If Person X Favors SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, would Person X favor or oppose DRUG 
TESTING FOR WELFARE RECIPIENTS? 
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8. If Person X Favors STEM CELL RESEARCH, would Person X favor or oppose CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT (i.e. the Death Penalty)? 
9. If Person X Favors STEM CELL RESEARCH, would Person X favor or oppose DRUG 
TESTING FOR WELFARE RECIPIENTS? 
10. If Person X Favors CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (i.e. the Death Penalty), would Person X 
favor or oppose DRUG TESTING FOR WELFARE RECIPIENTS? 
 Target-Similar Issues. 
1. If Person X Favors IMMIGRATION LAWS, would Person X favor or oppose UNIVERSAL 
HEALTHCARE? 
2. If Person X Favors IMMIGRATION LAWS, would Person X favor or oppose RAISING THE 
MINIMUM LEGAL DRINKING AGE? 
3. If Person X Favors IMMIGRATION LAWS, would Person X favor or oppose GUN 
CONTROL? 
4. If Person X Favors IMMIGRATION LAWS, would Person X favor or oppose ABORTION 
RIGHTS? 
5. If Person X Favors UNIVERSAL HEALTHCARE, would Person X favor or oppose 
RAISING THE MINIMUM LEGAL DRINKING AGE? 
6. If Person X Favors UNIVERSAL HEALTHCARE, would Person X favor or oppose GUN 
CONTROL? 
7. If Person X Favors UNIVERSAL HEALTHCARE, would Person X favor or oppose 
ABORTION RIGHTS? 
8. If Person X Favors RAISING THE MINIMUM LEGAL DRINKING AGE, would Person X 
favor or oppose GUN CONTROL? 
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9. If Person X Favors RAISING THE MINIMUM LEGAL DRINKING AGE, would Person X 
favor or oppose ABORTION RIGHTS? 
10. If Person X Favors GUN CONTROL, would Person X favor or oppose ABORTION 
RIGHTS? 
 Target-Dissimilar Issues. 
1. If Person X Favors ELECTRIC VEHICLES (EVs), would Person X favor or oppose USE of 
COAL AND FOSSIL FUELS? 
2. If Person X Favors ELECTRIC VEHICLES (EVs), would Person X favor or oppose 
REDUCING THE SIZE OF NATIONAL PARKS? 
3. If Person X Favors ELECTRIC VEHICLES (EVs), would Person X favor or oppose 
INCREASING RESEARCH INTO NUCLEAR ENERGY? 
4. If Person X Favors ELECTRIC VEHICLES (EVs), would Person X favor or oppose 
ANIMAL TESTING? 
5. If Person X Favors REDUCING THE SIZE OF NATIONAL PARKS, would Person X favor 
or oppose USE of COAL AND FOSSIL FUELS? 
6. If Person X Favors REDUCING THE SIZE OF NATIONAL PARKS, would Person X favor 
or oppose INCREASING RESEARCH INTO NUCLEAR ENERGY? 
7. If Person X Favors REDUCING THE SIZE OF NATIONAL PARKS, would Person X favor 
or oppose ANIMAL TESTING? 
8. If Person X Favors USE of COAL AND FOSSIL FUELS, would Person X favor or oppose 
INCREASING RESEARCH INTO NUCLEAR ENERGY? 
9. If Person X Favors USE of COAL AND FOSSIL FUELS, would Person X favor or oppose 
ANIMAL TESTING? 
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10. If Person X Favors INCREASING RESEARCH INTO NUCLEAR ENERGY, would Person 







Political Knowledge. The next few questions are meant to quickly assess your political 
knowledge. 
1. What job or political office is currently held by Mitch McConnell? 
Speaker of the House      Senate Majority Leader      Vice President         Attorney General 
2. Whose responsibility is it to determine whether or not a law is constitutional: The President, 
Congress, or the Supreme Court? 
3. How much of a majority is required for the U.S. Senate and House to overturn a presidential 
veto? 
 3/4   2/5   2/3   51% 
4. Which party currently has the most members in the House of Representatives? 
 Democratic                                            Republican 
5. It is generally believed that one of the parties is more conservative than the other at the 
national level. Which party is more conservative? 
 Democratic                                            Republican 
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Demographics, Debriefing questions, and Attention checks 
 Demographics. We would like to know a little about you for our records.  Please 
keep in mind this information will be kept confidential. 
1.     What is your gender? 
a.     Male 
b.     Female 
c.     Other 
2.     What is your class standing? 
a.     Freshman 
b.     Sophomore 
c.     Junior 
d.     Senior 
e.     Other 
3.     What is your age? 
 _________ 
4.     What is your race or ethnicity? 
a.     Asian or Pacific Islander 
b.     Black/African American 
c.     White/European American 
d.     Hispanic/Latinx 
e.     Mixed race 
f.      Other 
5. Is English your first language? 
 Yes                           No 
 
 Debriefing Questionnaire. You are now finished with the study. Before you leave, we 
would like you to answer some questions about the study. Please give your honest answers. 
1. What were your impressions of the study? 
 _________________________________________________________ 
2. What do you think the experimenters were trying to do with this study? 
 _________________________________________________________ 




1. How distracted were you while completing the study? 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all distracted 
  
 Very distracted 
 
2. How seriously did you take this survey? 
1 2 3 4 5 
not at all seriously – 
skimmed through 
everything or 
responded at random 
  
 Very seriously – paid 
attention to all of the 
prompts 
and answered all the 
questions 
 




4. Lastly, it is vital to our study that we only include responses from people that devoted their 
full attention to this study. Otherwise, the efforts of many people (the researchers and other 
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